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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
AT KNOXVILLE
REBEKAH CARDENAS-MEADE, 
Plaintiff,
v. No. 3:09-CV-268 
(Phillips/Shirley)
PFIZER, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Rebekah Cardenas-Meade, has brought this action against her
former employer, Pfizer, Inc., alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA); 
violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Tennessee Disability Act 
(TDA); discrimination under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA); and 
retaliation under the Tennessee common law. This matter is before the court on the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, the defendant’s 
motion will be granted and this action dismissed.
I. Background
Defendant Pfizer is a research-based pharmaceutical company engaged in 
the discovery, development, manufacture and sale of prescription medications. The sale 
of Pfizer’s products is accomplished through sales representatives who are located 
throughout the United States and who call on physicians, hospitals and other healthcare
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providers to explain the benefits of Pfizer’s pharmaceutical products in order to generate 
sales of prescription medications.
In January 2006, plaintiff was hired by defendant for a sales representative 
position in Knoxville, Tennessee. Her job consisted of driving to local physicians’ offices 
and selling Pfizer products to them. She did not have an office to report to but worked out 
of her home. As a field representative, plaintiff only saw her district manager once a 
month, if that often, for monthly "field rides” or coaching sessions. From January 2006 
through September 2007, plaintiff consistently exceeded her quota in sales. She was 
ranked in the top five sales representatives in the region. She received several awards for 
her sales performance.
Pfizer has a mandatory six-phase training program for representatives that 
spans the first eighteen to twenty months of employment. The training program culminates 
in a three-day evaluation known as Phase VI training. Phase VI consists of a standardized 
computer test, a sales presentation and a territory analysis. The Phase VI evaluators are 
a regional manager, an assistant regional manager and one guest district manager from 
within the region. The evaluators score each candidate separately. The scores are then 
averaged and combined with the candidate’s score on the standardized computer test. The 
overall score determines whether the candidate passes Phase VI training. Unsuccessful 
candidates are placed on a final probation and given a second opportunity to pass Phase 
VI or face termination.
2
Case 3:09-cv-00268 Document 35 Filed 12/05/11 Page 2 of 21 PagelD #: <pageID>
Plaintiff was originally scheduled for Phase VI training in August 2007. At the 
time, plaintiff told her district manager, Bo Shealy, that she was having personal problems 
in her marriage and with finding childcare for her young daughter. Plaintiff was the sole 
breadwinner in her family as her husband is disabled. She told Shealy that she felt 
unprepared for Phase VI because she had not had an opportunity to do a "mock” 
presentation for her sales team and receive feedback from a manager. Shealy advised her 
that she could postpone Phase VI, and the training was rescheduled at plaintiff’s request 
to October 2007. Four sales representatives, two men and two women, including plaintiff, 
participated in the October training. The evaluators were regional manager, James 
MacDougall; assistant regional manager, Christine Pullen; and guest district manager, 
Orlando Jackson. Plaintiff failed Phase VI training in October 2007 with a score of 63, 
below a passing score of 75. The other three participants passed.
Phase VI ended on Thursday, October 11, 2007. Plaintiff understood that 
because she failed Phase VI, when she returned to work, she would be placed on final 
probation that would give her six months to pass Phase VI or be terminated. Plaintiff never 
returned to work. Instead, plaintiff went out on medical leave the next day and did not work 
again before her termination on June 17, 2008. Plaintiff avers that she went on medical 
leave because of her alleged treatment by MacDougall during the Phase VI evaluation. 
Specifically, she testified, "I had felt ridiculed and humiliated. I felt like I had been 
discriminated against, and I didn’t want to subject myself to any more of that treatment.” 
Plaintiff further testified that she was treated in a demeaning and humiliating way by
3
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MacDougall during Phase VI when he interrupted her, was argumentative, was not 
engaged, called her a liar, and said she lacked "emotional intelligence.”
While she acknowledges that the other female participant passed the training
class, plaintiff complains that she failed Phase VI because of gender discrimination.
Plaintiff avers that the other female participant was not treated the same way:
Jim MacDougall didn’t treat Megyn Byrd like he treated me, nor 
did he treat the males like he treated me. He was degrading.
He humiliated me. He interrupted me. The other female 
wasn’t told to button her blouse.
Plaintiff believed the difference in treatment was related to a discussion she had with her
district manager Shealy about child care:
I had told Bo Shealy that I was having issues with child care.
I disclosed that to him . . . [Shealy] did disclose to me that he 
would share that information with Jim MacDougall. So it is my 
belief that because he shared that information with Mr.
MacDougall [I] was treated different than Megyn and the other 
two men that were there because of that.
Megyn Byrd was also married with young children. Nonetheless, plaintiff states that 
because of what he had been told about her personal issues, MacDougall was predisposed 
to believe that she would be and was unprepared for training. Plaintiff avers that evaluators 
Pullen and Jackson were influenced by MacDougall to give her failing scores in Phase VI. 
Pullen, however, testified that the failing scores she gave plaintiff were not influenced by 
MacDougall, and her scores reflected her independent opinion that plaintiff was unprepared 
for the Phase VI evaluation.
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On January 7, 2008, plaintiff made a complaint about MacDougall’s treatment 
of her through Pfizer’s "Global Compliance Alertline,” an employee reporting service. Amy 
Jenner, Executive Vice President of Sales in New York, and MacDougall’s supervisor, 
contacted plaintiff regarding her complaint on January 25. During the conversation, plaintiff 
requested a transfer to another sales territory. She also inquired about retaking Phase VI 
with different evaluators. Jenner was unable to informally resolve plaintiff’s complaint and 
forwarded the matter to Human Resources.
Plaintiff documented her concerns over Phase VI training in a letter to Pfizer 
dated January 24, 2008. Human Resources representative Kerry Sorvino investigated the 
complaint and concluded that plaintiff failed Phase VI for legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons. Sorvino did not contact plaintiff with the results of the investigation, consistent 
with Pfizer practice, because plaintiff was on medical leave.
On January 29, 2008, Shealy and MacDougall completed a failing 
performance evaluation for plaintiff. She was rated "below expectations” because she had 
not passed Phase VI. Shealy testified that it was "standard” for employees who had failed 
Phase VI to be rated below expectations until such time as they passed Phase VI.
Plaintiff states that she was disabled by her treatment at Phase VI beginning 
in October 2007 because she experienced sleeplessness, depression, anxiety and inability 
to concentrate because of MacDougall’s behavior. In December 2007, plaintiff’s treating 
psychologist, Dr. Carrie Booher, opined that "environmental factors at her current job play
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a significant role in her distress” so that plaintiff’s return to "her previous work environment 
is likely to be counter-therapeutic at this time.” Dr. Booher estimated that after two months 
of therapy, plaintiff might be able to return to her current work environment. Plaintiff 
testified that, in fact, the symptoms began alleviating in February 2008 and that she was 
feeling "a lot better” by March 2008. However, by facsimile dated March 12, 2008, 
plaintiff’s prescribing psychologist, Dr. Jill Powell, opined that "Ms. Meade had responded 
well to medication but is not yet ready to return to work.”
A month later on April 16, 2008, three days after plaintiff’s short-term disability 
benefits expired, Dr. Booher submitted an Employee Return to Work Status form that 
stated that plaintiff could return to work on April 21,2008 with unspecified restrictions for 
approximately two months. In an addendum to the Return to Work form, Dr. Booher 
explained that plaintiff still experienced "a great deal of anxiety” when anticipating 
interactions with her co-workers and managers. Dr. Booher stated, however, that plaintiff’s 
interactions with people outside of her work environment to whom she provides 
professional services "do not appear impaired due to psychological problems.”
By letter dated April 18, 2008, Pfizer’s Regional Medical Director, Dr. Agatha 
Nody, responded that upon clearance to return to work, plaintiff would be returning to her 
current managers. Relying on Dr. Booher’s statements in the Return to Work addendum, 
Dr. Nody observed that "it appears that your patient is still impaired from returning to her 
current job.” Dr. Nody sought both clarification and specific restrictions from Dr. Booher. 
Dr. Booher confirmed on April 22 that "due to the fact that the primary triggering event for
6
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these symptoms occurred in the workplace and involved, according to plaintiff, being 
treated in a humiliating fashion in the workplace, identifying exactly when she will be able 
to return to the same environment that triggered these symptoms is difficult.” Nonetheless, 
Dr. Booher submitted a treatment plan that indicated June 2008 as the target date for 
plaintiff’s integration into her current work environment. Dr. Booher did not specify any 
other restriction or accommodation that would have returned plaintiff to work for her current 
supervisors in April 2008. Dr. Nody responded by letter to plaintiff that she understood Dr. 
Booher’s April 22 letter and the treatment plan listing June 2008 as a possible return to 
work to mean that plaintiff was not yet medically able to return to work for her current 
supervisors in April 2008.
Plaintiff claims that she requested three accommodations from her employer: 
(1) a return to work in an alternative work area (for different supervisors) under Pfizer’s 
Transitional Return to Work program; (2) a transfer; or (3) the ability to work under two 
other district managers in the same territory/work area. Plaintiff acknowledges that all three 
accommodations requested that she return to work for different supervisors: "I could return 
back to work and do my same duties if I wasn’t working with [Shealy] and [MacDougall].”
Dr. Nody testified that the Transitional Return to Work program permitted light 
duty assignments in alternate work areas where applicable but had never been used to 
permit an employee to temporarily work for a different supervisor. Likewise, Human 
Resources representative, Steve Smith, testified that during his tenure with Pfizer, he was 
not aware of anyone using the Return to Work program to work for another supervisor
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unless there was a reorganization and a division had changed. Dr. Nody did not return 
plaintiff to work because her doctor had not released her to return to work with her current 
managers or identified any other restrictions.
Defendant avers that while still a Pfizer employee, plaintiff applied for and was 
hired effective May 12, 2008 to work as a pharmaceutical representative for a competitor, 
inVentive. Plaintiff told no one at Pfizer that she had started to work at inVentive. She did 
not return the Pfizer-provided company car when she started working for inVentive, and 
even continued to use the Pfizer credit card and submitted reimbursement requests to 
Pfizer while working for inVentive.
Based on information from another Pfizer representative, Shealy informed 
MacDougall that plaintiff may be working for a competitor. MacDougall in turn informed 
Steve Smith in Human Resources who later told MacDougall that an investigation 
confirmed that plaintiff was working for a competitor. On June 17, 2008, MacDougall and 
his supervisor, Vice President Amy Jenner made the decision to terminate plaintiff. A 
termination letter was sent to plaintiff stating that she was terminated based on confirmation 
that she had been employed by inVentive since May 12, 2008.
On May 14, 2008, plaintiff filed a charge of disability and gender 
discrimination with the EEOC. On June 30, 2008, plaintiff filed a second charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC.
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II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of showing the absence of a genuine 
issue of fact rests with the moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At 
this stage, the court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 
574, 587 (1986).
However, summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the 
burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of that party’s case. Tolton 
v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995). "The mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence to support the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). I.
III. Pfizer is Entitled To Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s FMLA Claim
The FMLA entitles qualifying employees up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave 
in a twelve month period for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 
perform the essential functions of her job. Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481,485 
(6th Cir. 2005). Qualifying employees who return to work within that twelve-week period are 
entitled to be reinstated to their same or similar position. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). Once the 
twelve-week period ends, however, employees who remain unable to work have no right
9
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to job restoration. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b); Edgar v. JAC Products, 443 F.3d 501,506 (6th 
Cir. 2006).
Here, plaintiff requested and was granted FMLA leave for a serious health 
condition in October 2007. Her twelve weeks of FMLA leave ended on January 7, 2008. 
Plaintiff did not seek to return to work before Spring 2008. In fact, she did not submit a 
request to return to work until April 2008 after her doctor opined in March that plaintiff "is 
not yet ready to return to work.” Because plaintiff exhausted her twelve-week entitlement 
to FMLA leave and was not able to return to work by the time such leave was exhausted, 
she was not denied any substantive rights under the FMLA when defendant declined to 
return her to work for different supervisors in April 2008. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 506; Hicks v. 
Leroy’s Jewelers Inc., 225 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2000) (an employee who cannot return to work 
at the end of the approved leave is not entitled to job restoration). Accordingly, the court 
finds that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s FMLA claim.
IV. Pfizer is Entitled To Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Disability Claims
The framework for analyzing a discrimination claim is similar whether 
asserted under the ADA, Title VII or corresponding state law.1 To prevail on her disability 
discrimination claims under both federal and state law, plaintiff must establish a prima facie
1 The Tennessee Supreme Court has determined that it will look to federal law for guidance in enforcing the 
state’s anti-discrimination laws -  the THA and the THRA. See Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 
705 (Tenn. 2000), abrogated in part by Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010) (disapproving the 
use of the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), at the summary judgment 
stage of retaliatory discharge cases). As a result, this court’s analysis of either federal or Tennessee law will be the same 
in this case.
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case that: (1) she had a disability as defined by law; (2) she was otherwise qualified to 
perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and 
(3) she was discriminated against solely because of her disability. See Talley v. Family 
Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 12008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19342 (6th Cir. 2008); Thorpe v. Alber’s 
Inc., 922 F.Supp. 84 (E.D.Tenn. 1996). In claims of failure to reasonably accommodate a 
disability, the third element is stated as (3) the employer was aware of the disability and 
failed to provide a reasonable and necessary accommodation for the disability. Ford v. 
Shaun Frame, 3 Fed. Appx. 316 (6th Cir. 2001).
To establish a disability under the ADA or the TDA, an individual must: (1) 
have a physical or mental impairment which "substantially limits” her in at least one "major 
life activity;” (2) have a record of such impairment; or (3) be regarded by the employer as 
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). "Major life activities” are defined as 
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "When the major life 
activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ 
requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of 
jobs.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,491 (1999).
Several federal courts have held that personality conflicts, workplace stress, 
and being unable to work with a particular person or persons do not rise to the level of a 
"disability” or inability to work for purposes of the ADA. Fricke v. E.I. Dupont Co., 219 Fed. 
Appx. 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2007). The major life activity of working is not "substantially limited”
11
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if plaintiff merely cannot work under a certain supervisor because of anxiety and stress 
related to his review of her job performance. See Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 90 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff seeking removal from a supervisor "whose 
supervisory techniques were the known cause of the stress she experienced” was not 
substantially limited in a class or broad range of jobs); Greer v. Emerson Elec. Co., 185 
F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (even if the employee’s impairments made her unable to work with 
her particular supervisor, "this does not mean that Greer was substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working”); Seimon v. AT&T, 113 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1997) (the 
plaintiff’s inability to work under a few supervisors was not a disability because it did "not 
prevent him from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs”); Gaul v. AT&T, Inc., 
955 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J. 1997) (when an employee "merely needed to transfer away from 
[his supervisor] to accommodate " his depression and stress disorders, he is not covered 
under the ADA).
Here, Dr. Booher confirmed that the primary triggering event for plaintiff’s 
anxiety or depression "occurred in the workplace,” and that she experienced "a great deal 
of anxiety when anticipating interactions with her co-workers and managers but not people 
outside of her work environment.” Plaintiff admits that she could return to work as a 
pharmaceutical representative in April 2008 so long as she was not working for either 
MacDougall or Shealy. It is undisputed that plaintiff’s alleged impairment lasted no more 
than five months. "Short-term temporary restrictions are not substantially limiting.” Roush 
v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff 
was not disabled under the ADA or the TDA.
12
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Alternatively, plaintiff alleges that Pfizer regarded her as disabled when Dr. 
Nody did not release her to return to work in April 2008. The Supreme Court has identified 
two ways in which an individual can be "regarded” as having a disability: (1) an employer 
can be under the mistaken belief that the employee is disabled, when in fact she is not; or 
(2) the employee can actually have a physical impairment, and the employer is aware of 
it, but the employer mistakenly believes that the employee is disabled because of the 
impairment when in fact she is not. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489
(1999) ; see also E.E.O.C v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006). 
Here, Pfizer accepted the treating doctor’s opinion that plaintiff could only return to work 
as a sales representative if she did not work for supervisors MacDougall and Shealy. 
However, plaintiff has not shown that Pfizer regarded her as unable to work in a broad 
class of jobs, but merely unable to work for her two supervisors. Therefore, her claim that 
Pfizer "regarded” her as disabled fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiff has also failed to present evidence of a causal connection between 
her alleged disability and her termination. Defendant asserts that plaintiff was terminated 
because she was working for a competitor. Once defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory 
reason for plaintiff’s termination, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden of production shifts 
to plaintiff to show that Pfizer’s stated reason for her termination was pretext. To establish 
pretext, plaintiff must show that defendant’s reason either (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did 
not actually motivate the adverse action, or (3) the reason was insufficient to motivate the 
adverse action. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000) ; Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994).
13
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Plaintiff must produce "sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject [the 
defendants'] explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against 
him.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.2003). "The jury may not reject an 
employer's explanation ... unless there is a sufficient basis in the evidence for doing so.” 
Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083. If the employer had an honest belief in the proffered basis for the 
adverse employment action, and that belief arose from reasonable reliance on the 
particularized facts before the employer when it made the decision, the asserted reason 
will not be deemed pretextual even if it was erroneous. See Sybrandt v. Home Depot, 
U.S.A., Inc., 560 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Majewski v. Auto. Data Processing, 
Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir.2001) (noting that "as long as an employer has an 
honest belief in its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the 
employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately 
shown to be incorrect”)). Moreover, an employee’s own speculation, unsupported by fact, 
is not enough to establish pretext. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Corp., 576 F.3d 576, 587 (6th Cir. 
2009). Nor is "mere conjecture that the employer’s explanation is a pretext for 
discrimination a basis for denying summary judgment.” Id. Here, plaintiff admits that she 
was working for a competitor, which violated both defendant’s policy and her employment 
agreement. There is no probative evidence in the record suggesting a discriminatory intent 
for her termination. Therefore, because plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact indicating that Pfizer’s decision to terminate her was a pretext for 
discrimination, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA and TDA 
claims.
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Plaintiff also alleges that defendant failed to provide her a reasonable 
accommodation so that she could return to work in April 2008. Even assuming, arguendo, 
that she was disabled, the accommodation she requested, that she be transferred (either 
permanently or temporarily) to different supervisors, is not one that defendant was required 
to make. Although a transfer can be a reasonable accommodation under certain 
circumstances, in the instant case, Pfizer has produced evidence that a transfer would not 
be a reasonable accommodation. In each of her three requested accommodations, plaintiff 
requests Pfizer to transfer her to different supervisors. In Weiler v. Household Finance 
Corp., 101 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1996) the plaintiff argued that she should be returned to work 
under a different supervisor. The court observed that the plaintiff "asks us to allow her to 
establish the conditions of her employment, most notably, who will supervise her. Nothing 
in the ADA allows this shift in responsibility.” Id. at 524 (citing Wernick v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2nd Cir. 1996) (failure to assign employee to work 
under different supervisor did not violate reasonable accommodation requirement of ADA 
and Rehabilitation Act); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance; Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, NO. 
915.002 ("an employer does not have to provide an employee with a new supervisor as a 
reasonable accommodation”).
District Manager Shealy testified that available positions at Pfizer are "posted” 
and that anyone in "good standing” is able to apply for a position. He also testified that 
while Pfizer had allowed other sales representatives to transfer for a variety of reasons, all 
the representatives who had transferred had each successfully completed Phase VI.
15
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Plaintiff requested a transfer from Shealy in 2007. Shealy told plaintiff that the only way 
she could get a transfer was if she attended and passed Phase VI training. After she failed 
Phase VI, plaintiff knew that when she returned to work, she would be on probation and 
ineligible to apply for a transfer until she successfully passed Phase VI. There is no 
evidence in the record that Pfizer had transferred any sales representative because of an 
inability to get along with their supervisor much less authorized such a transfer for a sales 
representative who had not yet passed Phase VI. Because plaintiff’s proposed 
accommodation was unreasonable, her claim for failure to accommodate fails as a matter 
of law.
Moreover, under Sixth Circuit law, because plaintiff claims that she was 
regarded as being disabled by Pfizer, the company had no duty to provide an 
accommodation. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Under the 
third prong, ‘regarded as’ having a disability, the defendant correctly contends that a finding 
on this basis would obviate the Company’s obligation to reasonable accommodate” the 
employee); see also Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4810 (6th Cir. 
Tenn. 2011). Because an alleged failure to accommodate is the basis for plaintiff’s 
"regarded as " disability claim, that claim also fails as a matter of law.
16
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V. Pfizer is Entitled To Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Gender Discrimination 
Claims
Plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender 
when defendant refused to return her to work and when it discharged her. To establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII or the THRA, plaintiff must show that: (1) 
she is a member of a protected class; (2) she has suffered an adverse employment action; 
(3) she was performing her job satisfactorily; and (4) similarly-situated employees who are 
not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 
795, 800 (6th Cir. 1996). Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth element 
with respect to her return to work claim, or the second and fourth elements with respect to 
her termination claims.
Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Booher, opined that plaintiff could not 
return to work for her current supervisors in April 2008. Plaintiff makes no allegations, and 
the record does not show, that Pfizer transferred a similarly situated male employee to work 
for different supervisors. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s gender discrimination 
claim with respect to her return to work claim fails as a matter of law.
As to her termination claim, it is undisputed that plaintiff was terminated in 
June 2008 after Pfizer confirmed that she began working for a competitor in May 2008, in 
violation of Pfizer policy and her employment agreement. Therefore, plaintiff cannot show 
that she was performing her job satisfactorily at the time of her termination. In addition, 
plaintiff has not alleged or shown that a similarly situated male employee at Pfizer, who was
17
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known to be working for a competitor, was not terminated. Plaintiff has not shown that 
Pfizer’s stated reason for her termination was pretextual. Accordingly, her gender 
discrimination claim based on her termination fails as a matter of law.
Although not alleged in her complaint, plaintiff testified in her deposition that 
she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender when she failed Phase VI training 
in October 2007. Specifically, she claims that her regional manager, Jim McDougall, 
singled her out for harassment and discrimination at the training and that she failed 
because of her gender. However, Megyn Byrd, another woman who attended Phase VI 
with plaintiff successfully completed Phase VI. Nonetheless, plaintiff alleges that she was 
treated differently because she was a woman with child care issues and/or marital 
problems.
Plaintiff’s subjective belief that she successfully completed the Phase VI 
training alone is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case that she was performing her 
job satisfactorily. A plaintiff may not substitute her own business judgment for that of the 
employer. Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys. Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2004). 
Here, the three Phase VI evaluators independently rated plaintiff as failing the class. In 
addition, plaintiff fails to identify any class of comparators with respect to her claims of 
disparate treatment. Title VII prohibits "gender plus” discrimination, by which an employer 
discriminates, not against the class of men or women as a whole, but against a subclass 
of men or women so designated by their gender plus another characteristic. See Fuller v.
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GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F.Supp. 653 (M.D.Tenn. 1996); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular 
Wireless, 324 F.Supp.2d 875 (M.D.Tenn. 2004).
Even in the "gender plus” analysis, plaintiff must produce evidence that 
similarly situated males were treated differently and that there was no adequate non-gender 
explanation for the different treatment. Fuller, 926 F.Supp. at 658 (citing Fisher v. Vasser 
College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2nd Cir. 1995) (to establish that the employer discriminated on the 
basis of sex plus marital status, plaintiff must show that married men were treated 
differently from married women). Here, plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to show 
that the two men who participated in Phase VI were fathers of young children or married 
men and received better treatment. Moreover, the other female candidate, Megyn Byrd, 
was also married with young children, and there are no allegations that she was singled out 
for discrimination. Even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of gender 
discrimination, defendant has established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her 
failing Phase VI. The other two evaluators, Pullen and Jackson, stated that plaintiff failed 
to deliver a passing performance; therefore, gender is an unlikely explanation for plaintiff’s 
failure to successfully Phase VI. Accordingly, plaintiff’s gender discrimination fails as a 
matter of law.
VI. Pfizer is Entitled To Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff alleges that defendant refused to return her to work and thereafter 
terminated her in retaliation for (1) taking FMLA leave; (2) making an internal complaint of 
gender discrimination; (3) complaining to the EEOC; and (4) because she allegedly had a
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disability and/or requested an accommodation in violation of the FMLA, the ADA, the TDA, 
Title VII, the THRA and Tennessee common law. To establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the relevant 
statues; (2) the exercise of her rights was known by the defendant; (3) the defendant took 
an adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal link exists between the 
protected action and the adverse employment action. Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 f.3d 
652. 661 (6th Cir. 1999). If a prima facie case of retaliation is established, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action. Id. Plaintiff then bears the burden of showing that the proffered 
reason for the action was merely a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id.
Plaintiff engaged in protected activity under Title VII, the THRA and the 
Tennessee common law when she made complaints of gender discrimination, harassment 
and retaliation through Pfizer’s employee hotline on January 7 and January 24, 2008; to 
MacDougall’s supervisor, Amy Jenner, on January 25, 2008; to Kerry Sorvino on January 
31,2008; and when she filed charges of disability and gender discrimination with the EEOC 
on May 14, 2008.
Dr. Nody, Pfizer’s Regional Medical Director, was responsible for evaluating 
whether plaintiff was cleared medically to return to work. At the time she made the decision 
that plaintiff was not cleared to return to work, Dr. Nody testified she was not aware that 
plaintiff had made an internal or external complaint of discrimination. Nor has plaintiff 
shown that a causal link exists between her request for leave and her return to work.
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Plaintiff’s doctor confirmed she was unable to return to work for her current supervisors 
until at least June 2008. Nor has plaintiff shown that Pfizer’s stated reason for her 
termination, that she went to work for a competitor, was in retaliation for her complaints of 
discrimination. Because she cannot show any evidence of pretext, plaintiff’s claims of 
retaliation fail as a matter of law.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 12] 
is GRANTED, whereby this action is DISMISSED in its entirety.
ENTER:
______s/ Thomas W. Phillips
United States District Judge
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